O objeto de estudo desta investigação é a filosofia do direito de Immanuel Kant, com ênfase na controvérsia acerca da natureza do conceito de direito por ele formulado. Assim, são analisados, em um primeiro momento, os conceitos centrais da filosofia moral de Kant que estão em conexão com sua ideia de direito e, em um segundo momento, os aspectos mais importantes do pensamento filosófico-jurídico kantiano. Busca-se, com isso, uma definição a respeito da melhor forma de entender a filosofia do direito (...) de Kant, se representante de um positivismo radical ou de um não-positivismo superinclusivo. (shrink)

CHAPTER ONE LIFE The extant evidence about Speusippus' life is scanty, and little of it is reliable. The reasons are not difficult to discover : the greater ...

This paper aims to provide a philosophical and theoretical account of biological communication grounded in the notion of organisation. The organisational approach characterises living systems as organised in such a way that they are capable to self-produce and self-maintain while in constant interaction with the environment. To apply this theoretical framework to the study of biological communication, we focus on a specific approach, based on the notion of influence, according to which communication takes place when a signal emitted by a (...) sender triggers a change in the behaviour of the receiver that is functional for the sender itself. We critically analyse the current formulations of this account, that interpret what is functional for the sender in terms of evolutionary adaptations. Specifically, the adoption of this etiological functional framework may lead to the exclusion of several phenomena usually studied as instances of communication, and possibly even of entire fields of investigation such as synthetic biology. As an alternative, we reframe the influence approach in organisational terms, characterising functions in terms of contributions to the current organisation of a biological system. We develop a theoretical account of biological communication in which communicative functions are distinguished from other types of biological functions described by the organisational account (e.g. metabolic, ecological, etc.). The resulting organisational-influence approach allows to carry out causal analyses of current instances of phenomena of communication, without the need to provide etiological explanations. In such a way it makes it possible to understand in terms of communication those phenomena which realise interactive patterns typical of signalling interactions – and are usually studied as such in scientific practice – despite not being the result of evolutionary adaptations. Moreover, this approach provides operational tools to design and study communicative interactions in experimental fields such as synthetic biology. (shrink)

Our culture and its scientific endeavor direly need a holistic characterization of mind and body. Many phenomena attest to the profound effects of beliefs on bodily function (e.g., open-label placebo's effects on chronic pain) and interoceptive systems’ role in mental processes (e.g., the emerging role of gut microbiomes in the mood). We need a mechanistic, integrative framework to account for these phenomena and generate novel predictions. Major advances have been made in understanding how the nervous system senses and regulates the (...) body and in modeling how the brain implements the computations that subserve such activities. However, the vestiges of Cartesianism have entrained a style of thinking in which systems from the brainstem downward exist as the implementation layer of computational processes supporting sensation and behavior, rather than a complementary locus of information processing. As speakers and microphones, rather than other members of the chorus. We are thus forced to perceive well-documented, belief-driven phenomena like placebo, ritual, and psychosomatic disorders as mysterious obstacles or dubious allies rather than as a wellspring of potential. (shrink)

El prefijo “auto” en autoorganización y autopoiesis se refiere a la existencia de una identidad o agencialidad implicada en el orden, organización o producción de un sistema que se corresponde con el sistema mismo, en contraste con el diseño o la influencia de carácter externo. La autoorganización (AO) estudia la manera en la que los procesos de un sistema alcanzan de forma espontánea un orden u organización complejo, bien como una estructura o patrón emergente, bien como algún tipo de finalidad (...) o identidad autoconstruida. En este trabajo nos ocupamos del concepto de AO en el contexto de la problemática sobre la naturaleza la vida y de los organismos vivientes. Este concepto se elabora en diferentes tradiciones científicas y filosóficas, a partir de su origen en la filosofía kantiana. La cibernética trata de emular la organización de los seres vivos y su teleología mediante la construcción de máquinas; desarrolla una perspectiva centrada en la regulación y en la causalidad mutua entre componentes del sistema. Estos trabajos, a veces complementados con la teoría de sistemas y la teoría de la información, son fundamentales para el desarrollo de la ciencia del siglo XX, especialmente las ciencias computacionales y la biología. Una segunda corriente surge desde la termodinámica de los procesos irreversibles alejados del equilibrio a partir, entre otros, de los trabajos de la escuela de Bruselas, en la que la AO se explora como la formación espontánea de estructuras de orden disipativo. Una tercera tradición, tal vez la más profundamente kantiana, se desarrolla en el contexto de la biología del desarrollo e integra a las dos mencionadas previamente, pues combina aspectos de las dos previas en el desarrollo ontogenético. Podemos decir que cada una de estas concepciones de la AO se relaciona con modelos paradigmáticos diferentes. La noción de autopoiesis (AP), por su parte, fue propuesta en los años 70 por los biólogos chilenos Humberto Maturana y Francisco Varela para explicar la organización individual de los seres vivos como un proceso dinámico que genera una identidad desde las operaciones del sistema (Maturana y Varela 1973). Puede decirse que hereda y reorganiza ideas de la tradición de la AO, especialmente la kantiana y la cibernética, para proponer una teoría biológica alternativa. El enfoque autopoiético concibe el fenómeno de la vida y a los seres vivos de forma muy diferente a la teoría de la evolución o la biología molecular que constituían las líneas de investigación predominantes en la biología de su tiempo. La teoría subraya como propiedad básica de un sistema viviente su autoconstitución dinámica como unidad dotada de identidad a partir de interacciones entre sus componentes. Sin embargo, aquellas propiedades de la vida consideradas primordiales en el enfoque darwiniano, como la reproducción o la evolución, se ven como secundarias, pues requieren de la existencia previa de sistemas autopoiéticos. El objetivo de esta voz es examinar diferentes aspectos que configuran las tradiciones autoorganizativa y autopoiética, en especial las tensiones conceptuales internas que permiten comprender los desafíos a los que se enfrentan ambas en el marco de la filosofía y la teoría de la biología, así como la forma en que sus posiciones e intuiciones contrastan con otras perspectivas en biología. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to render a detailed analysis of the correspondence with Clarke in order to shed some light in the relationship between the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles and the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Most of the secondary literature takes for granted that Leibniz derives the Principle of Identity of Indiscernible from the Principle of Sufficient Reason in at least some parts of the correspondence. This would render the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles a merely contingent (...) truth and not a necessary principle. I will argue that this interpretation is misleading, and that Leibniz never abandoned the idea that the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles is a necessary truth. Although he is continuously using the Principle of Sufficient Reason in his argumentation, he keeps in parallel a strong argumentation that entails the necessity of the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles. To achieve this goal, it will be necessary to point out first some contextual facts that may determine a correct understanding of the correspondence. It will be also necessary to frame the discussion about the principles into the broader debate on the possibility of Newtonian space. Finally, it will be shown that the mentioned hypothesis is supported by textual evidence throughout the entire correspondence. (shrink)

En su obra principal “Crítica de la razón pura”, Kant deja clara su intención de no solo investigar las cualidades epistemológicas del ser humano, sino también de fundamentar las ciencias naturales. Principalmente la física y las matemáticas. El libro “Fundamentaciones metafísicas de las ciencias naturales” continua este proyecto. En su prólogo se excluye aún más a ambas ciencias, al catalogarlas como las únicas portadoras de conocimientos sintéticos a priori. Los problemas surgen con la “Crítica del Juicio” y su apartado “Crítica (...) del Juicio teleológico”. Aquí, Kant intenta legitimar la biología como ciencia natural sin invadir el campo ocupado por la física matemática. El resultado es una biología que porta conocimientos necesarios pero que al mismo tiempo no puede brindarnos leyes constitutivas de la naturaleza. Esta nueva ciencia natural se torna irreconciliable con el sistema de las ciencias naturales que Kant mismo había planteado en sus libros anteriores. (shrink)

PORTUGUESE: Neste artigo, apresentaremos uma visão particular do desenvolvimento de teorias científicas que denominamos (inspirados em Ortega y Gasset) "perspectivismo". Discutiremos como, através desse enfoque, é possível compatibilizar diversas descrições aparentemente distintas e incompatíveis de uma suposta realidade que se investiga. Fazemos isso distinguindo entre a "realidade" (R) e a "descrição empírica da realidade" (Re). Aceitando que podemos ter diversas descrições empíricas de uma mesma realidade, discutimos o caso particular em que esse esquema é utilizado nos debates atuais acerca da (...) ontologia da física quântica, em especial da mecânica quântica não relativista. Como se sabe, essa teoria é compatível com distintas ontologias (ou metafísicas), em particular, pode ser vista como comprometida com uma ontologia de indivíduos, mas também com uma ontologia de não indivíduos. Ambas as alternativas são plausíveis e merecem ser desenvolvidas. Propomos que o perspectivismo aqui apresentado é neutro com relação à escolha de uma metafísica (ontologia), bem como aos debates entre realistas e antirrealistas em filosofia da ciência. Concluímos que passar do pluralismo aceito pelo perspectivista ao realismo ou antirrealismo envolve comprometimento com teses mais robustas acerca da relação entre realidade e descrição da realidade. ENGLISH: In this article we present a particular view of the development of scientific theories which (following Ortega y Gasset), we term "perspectivism". Making use of this view, we discuss how we can accommodate distinct and apparently incompatible descriptions of a supposed reality under investigation. We distinguish between a "reality" (R) and its "empirical description", (Re). Acknowledging that we can have diverse empirical descriptions of the same reality, we discuss the particular case in which the view is applied to current debates on the ontology of quantum physics, especially of non-relativistic quantum mechanics. As it is well known, this theory is compatible with treating quantum objects either as individuals or as non-individuals. Both ontologies are possible and deserve to be developed. We propose that the perspectivism developed here is neutral not only with respect to the choice of an ontology, but also concerning the debates among realists and anti-realists in the philosophy of science. We conclude that to go beyond the pluralism accepted by perspectivism, and to adopt realism or anti-realism, involves commitment to strong theses about the relation between reality and its descriptions. (shrink)

As considerações que faremos neste artigo vai analisar como o metabolismo se torna um mecanismo que representa o primeiro gesto de liberdade da vida na filosofia de Hans Jonas. A centralidade da discussão está no fato de que a vida é um processo de manutenção de si onde a liberdade está presente desde as estruturas mais simples do organismo às mais desenvolvidas. O nosso objetivo é o de mostrar, a partir de uma análise das ideias de liberdade e necessidade, como (...) a vida se abre para uma transcendência ou, tecnicamente falando, para uma nova ontologia. (shrink)

Our approach to the epistemology of post-truth is based on the idea that to fully comprehend any post-truth, going back to its origins (i.e., to the moment in which some faulty interpretations start to spread) can be not only relevant but illuminating.One of the most renowned cases of post-truth concerns vaccines and their alleged relationship with autism. It all started in 1998, when The Lancet published a study suggesting a link between the measles, mumps, and rubella vaccine and some symptoms (...) of autism. The case is relevant both because it is at the origins of contemporary anti-vaccinism and because it took twelve years to fully disprove what in 1998 was presented as a scientific truth: this means that the boundary between truth and falsehood has been blurred for a long period of time.For this purpose, we have applied the semiotic methodology to 20 articles from The Independent, 20 from The Telegraph, 20 from The Guardian, and 20 from The Daily Mail, published between 1998 and 2010. Unexpectedly, many elements that can be seen as ‘post-truth seeds’, such as conspiracy theories and the joint presentation of multiple truths, have been found even in the most scientifically accurate newspapers. (shrink)

RESUMENEn este trabajo se propone una física filosófica de causas como posible respuesta al problema del realismo que plantea la teoría de la ciencia actual. La clave de la respuesta estriba en la inactualidad y potencialidad de lo físico causal.PALABRAS CLAVESMETAFISICA – FISICA DE CAUSAS – REALISMOABSTRACTThe article defends a causal philosophical physics as a posible answer to the problema of realism set up by the current theory of science. The answers lies in the inactuality and potentiality of causal physics.KEYWORDSMETAPHYSICS (...) – CAUSAL PHYSICS – REALISM. (shrink)

This book argues that words and thoughts are typically about whatever they are about necessarily rather than contingently. The argument proceeds by articulating a requisite modal background and then bringing this background to bear on cognitive matters, notably the intentionality of cognitive episodes and states. The modal picture that emerges from the first two chapters is a strongly particularist one whereby possibilities reduce to possibilities for particular things (or pluralities thereof) where the latter are determined by the natures of the (...) particular things (or pluralities) involved. The next three chapters are devoted to the aboutness of referring terms in language and thought. The approach espoused is, again, strongly particularist in allotting explanatory priority to cognitive episodes and states regarding particular things (aka de re attitudes). (shrink)

Theories deploy various theoretical representations of their explananda and one question we can ask about those representations is whether to regard them under a realist attitude, i.e. as revealing the nature of what they represent, or whether to regard them under an instrumentalist attitude instead, i.e. as serving particular explanatory ends without the further revelatory aspect. I consider structured propositions as theoretical representations within a particular explanatory setting -- the metaphysics of what is said -- and argue that a realist (...) attitude towards them is unwarranted. I offer various considerations against the widespread tendency to regard structured propositions as revealing the nature of what is said and conclude that they should be regarded under an instrumentalist attitude instead. (shrink)

The Barcan formula (BF) is commonly paraphrased as the schematic conditional that if it is possible that there be a phi then something or other is possibly a phi. It is validated by the most straightforward systems of quantified modal logic. It is also widely considered to pose a threat to the commonsensical metaphysical view that there are no non-actual (or ‘merely possible’) things. I show how BF can be cleared of such a charge by construing it as a bridge (...) principle connecting modality de dicto and modality de re while retaining a Russellian robust sense of reality in modal matters. (shrink)

A problem inherited from Kripke is the reconciliation of commitments to various necessities with conflicting intuitions of contingency, intuitions that things "might have turned out otherwise." Kripke's reconciliation strategy is to say that while it is necessary that X is Y, and so impossible for X not to be Y, it is nevertheless epistemically possible for X not to be Y. But what are nonactual epistemic possibilities? Several answers are considered and it is concluded that scenarios adduced to explain away (...) the target intuitions are either themselves impossible, or not fully coherent, or not epistemic in the relevant sense. (shrink)

Theoretical representations in discussions surrounding the semantic significance of words and their analogs in thought should not be viewed under a realist interpretation as individually revealing what the represented items really are. Instead, they should be viewed under an instrumentalist interpretation as having other roles to play within their respective explanatory contexts. I consider some case studies for this broad methodological claim: theoretical representations of the semantic significance of words within semantics, theoretical representations of what determines the semantic significance of (...) words within metasemantics – both under the auspices of the so-called new theory of reference – and theoretical representations of cognitive attitudes within the Representational Theory of Mind. (shrink)

The question whether Frege’s theory of indirect reference enforces an infinite hierarchy of senses has been hotly debated in the secondary literature. Perhaps the most influential treatment of the issue is that of Burge (1979), who offers an argument for the hierarchy from rather minimal Fregean assumptions. I argue that this argument, endorsed by many, does not itself enforce an infinite hierarchy of senses. I conclude that whether or not the theory of indirect reference can avail itself of only finitely (...) many senses is pending further theoretical development. (shrink)

Biological regulation is what allows an organism to handle the effects of a perturbation, modulating its own constitutive dynamics in response to particular changes in internal and external conditions. With the central focus of analysis on the case of minimal living systems, we argue that regulation consists in a specific form of second-order control, exerted over the core regime of production and maintenance of the components that actually put together the organism. The main argument is that regulation requires a distinctive (...) architecture of functional relationships, and specifically the action of a dedicated subsystem whose activity is dynamically decoupled from that of the constitutive regime. We distinguish between two major ways in which control mechanisms contribute to the maintenance of a biological organisation in response to internal and external perturbations: dynamic stability and regulation. Based on this distinction an explicit definition and a set of organisational requirements for regulation are provided, and thoroughly illustrated through the examples of bacterial chemotaxis and the lac-operon. The analysis enables us to mark out the differences between regulation and closely related concepts such as feedback, robustness and homeostasis. (shrink)

Technology policy needs to be receptive to different social needs and realities to ensure that innovations are both ethically developed and accessible. This article proposes a new method to integrate social controversies into foresight scenarios as a means to enhance the trustworthiness and inclusivity of policymaking around Artificial Intelligence. Foresight exercises are used to anticipate future tech challenges and to inform policy development. However, the integration of social controversies within these exercises remains an unexplored area. This article aims to bridge (...) this gap by providing insights and guidelines on why and how we should incorporate social controversies into designing foresight scenarios. We emphasize the importance of considering social controversies, as they allow to understand non-mainstream perspectives, re-balance power dynamics, de-black box technologies and have accountable policymaking processes that are open to listening different social needs. Building on empirical research, we present a step-by-step method that involves identifying the key policy challenges and relevant controversies related to an emerging technology, deconstructing the identified controversies, and mapping them onto future scenarios to test policy options and build policy road mapping. Furthermore, we discuss the importance of strategically engaging involved stakeholders, including affected communities, civil society organizations, and experts, to ensure a comprehensive and inclusive perspective. Finally, we showcase the application of the method to popAI, an EU-funded project on AI use in law enforcement. (shrink)

How the semantic significance of numerical discourse gets determined is a metasemantic issue par excellence. At the sub-sentential level, the issue is riddled with difficulties due to the contested metaphysical status of the subject matter of numerical discourse, i.e. numbers and numerical properties and relations. I propose to set those difficulties aside and focus instead on the sentential level, specifically, on obvious affinities between whole numerical and non-numerical sentences and how their significance is determined. From such a perspective, Frege's 1884 (...) construction of number, while famously mathematically untenable, fares better than other approaches in the philosophy of mathematics. Despite the work's foundational untenability, it is metasemantically superior to extant alternatives. (shrink)

I consider two competing approaches to metasemantics: productivism, whereby endowment with semantic significance emerges directly from conditions surrounding the production or employment of the items semantically endowed; and interpretationism, whereby endowment with semantic significance emerges directly from conditions surrounding the interpretive consumption of such items. Focusing on the version of interpretationism developed by Lewis and his followers, I present a novel argument to the conclusion that such an approach cannot secure determinacy for singular reference. I then draw a larger moral (...) for metasemantics and its relation to truth-conditional semantics. (shrink)

Metasemantics is the metaphysics of semantic endowment: it asks how expressions become endowed with their semantic significance. Assuming that semantics is of the usual truth-conditional sort, metasemantics asks after the determinants of expressions’ distinctive contributions to truth-conditions. There are two widely divergent general approaches to the metasemantic project. Some theories – “productivist” ones such as causal theories or intention-based theories – emphasize conditions of production or employment of the items semantically endowed. Other metasemantic theories – “interpretationist” ones – emphasize conditions (...) of interpretive consumption or reception of such items. The book aims to articulate a set of considerations that favour metasemantic productivism over metasemantic interpretationism, to reconcile a general productivist metasemantic approach with contemporary truth-conditional semantics, and to apply the approach to more specialized case studies in the philosophy of language broadly construed. Finally, a major concern in contemporary philosophy of language after Quine is semantic indeterminacy, the worry that there is no fact of the matter as to the semantic significance of our words. The book articulates a distinctly metasemantic strategy to counter the worry. It is shown how the present approach delivers a more successful response to semantic indeterminacy than extant alternatives, a response that emphasizes the priority of reference over truth, which is both intuitively compelling and theoretically motivated. (shrink)

O artigo tem por objetivo contribuir para a já antiga discussão sobre a relação de Kant com a metafísica expondo os diversos sentidos que esta disciplina assume na filosofia crítica. Orientada por um interesse sistemático e tendo por base o capítulo sobre a Arquitetônica da Razão Pura da Crítica da razão pura, a presente investigação procura esclarecer a reformulação por que passam na filosofia crítica kantiana as disciplinas tradicionais da metafísica racionalista, mais precisamente a metaphysica generalis e a metaphysica specialis, (...) reconfiguradas em uma analítica do entendimento e em uma fisiologia da razão, respectivamente, e ancoradas no projeto propriamente kantiano de uma Metafísica dos Costumes e uma Metafísica da Natureza. (shrink)

Particular possibilities -- such as that this particular chair occupy the only vacant corner of my office -- are commonly supposed to depend on what actual things there are and what they are like, whereas general possibilities -- such as that some chair or other occupy some vacant corner or other of some office or other -- are commonly supposed not to be so dependent. I articulate a different conception whereby general possibilities are no less determined by what actual things (...) there are and what they are like than particular possibilities. Ramifications of this approach are highlighted and brought to bear on a problem often raised for actualist essentialism. (shrink)

Palabras de agradecimiento al promotor del Congreso Internacional y a los participantes en él. Asimismo, a la persona que ha trabajado en la labor de transcripción de mis escritos y a otros colaboradores míos. También a quienes han tomado en cuenta mis ideas para elaborar sus tesis doctorales, y a otros colegas cuyos planteamientos filosóficos distan de los míos. Como la filosofía es una actividad interminable, queda abierta la sucesiva investigación en mis propuestas.

The question of the origin of polyadic expressivity is explored and the results are brought to bear on Bertrand Russell's 1903 theory of denoting concepts, which is the main object of criticism in his 1905 "On Denoting". It is shown that, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, the background ontology of the earlier theory of denoting enables the full-blown expressive power of first-order polyadic quantification theory without any syntactic accommodation of scopal differences among denoting phrases such as 'all φ', 'every φ', (...) and 'any φ' on the one hand, and 'some φ' and 'a φ' on the other. The case provides an especially vivid illustration of the general point that structural (or ideological) austerity can be paid for in the coin of ontological extravagance. (shrink)

The notion of efficient proof-checking has always been central to complexity theory, and it gave rise to the definition of the class NP. In the last 15 years there has been a number of exciting, unexpected and deep developments in complexity theory that exploited the notion of randomized and interactive proof-checking. Results developed along this line of research have diverse and powerful applications in complexity theory, cryptography, and the theory of approximation algorithms for combinatorial optimization problems. In this paper we (...) survey the main lines of developments in interactive and probabilistic proof-checking, with an emphasis on open questions. (shrink)

That expressions should have their contents can seem paradigmatically contingent. But it can also seem a priori that expressions in one's own language should have their contents to the extent that instances of disquotation, such as "Socrates" refers to Socrates' and "cat" refers to cats', are trivially true. I attempt to reconcile these conflicting intuitions about meaningfulness by examining semantic and metasemantic details of linguistic reflexivity. I argue that instances of disquotation are contingent analytic in Kaplan's sense, and bring this (...) lesson to bear on semantic strategies for responding to skepticism, such as Putnam's Brains-in-a-Vat argument. (shrink)

There is a salient contrast in how theoretical representations are regarded. Some are regarded as revealing the nature of what they represent, as in familiar cases of theoretical identification in physical chemistry where water is represented as hydrogen hydroxide and gold is represented as the element with atomic number 79. Other theoretical representations are regarded as serving other explanatory aims without being taken individually to reveal the nature of what they represent, as in the representation of gold as a standard (...) for pre-20th century monetary systems in economics or the representation of the meaning of an English sentence as a function from possible worlds to truth values in truth-conditional semantics. Call the first attitude towards a theoretical representation *realist* and the second attitude *instrumentalist*. Philosophical explanation purports to reveal the nature of whatever falls within its purview, so it would appear that a realist attitude towards its representations is a natural default. I offer reasons for skepticism about such default realism that emerge from attending to several case studies of philosophical explanation and drawing a general metaphilosophical moral from the foregoing discussion. (shrink)

A centerpiece of Juhani Yli-Vakkuri and John Hawthorne’s Narrow Content (OUP 2018) is the parameter proliferation argument. The authors consider a series of cleverly constructed cases of pairs of corresponding thoughts of qualitatively identical twins and argue that divergence in truth value for such thoughts forces the internalist to admit novel alethic parameters for semantic evaluation that are not independently motivated. I argue that the internalist will resist this argument by denying that such pairs of thoughts diverge in truth value. (...) I then argue that the construal of content presupposed by the argument should be rejected or amended by the internalist on independent grounds. I end in a more diagnostic vein by considering why parameter proliferation might have seemed pressing for internalism to begin with. (shrink)

Token-reflexivity is commonly understood as reference of a token to a token of which it is a part, proper or not. It may be compared with its familiar formal kin – Gödelian reflexivity. In this paper the possibility of the latter type of construction in a formal setting provides a stark point of contrast with token-reflexivity understood as token self-reference, a purported species of natural phenomena, with the token-reflexives themselves understood as the bearers of self-reference. I argue that there is (...) no token-reflexivity thus understood, and so, no token-reflexives. The case provides a particularly useful background against which to discuss the centrality of conditions of production – as opposed to conditions of consumption – in the study of natural language. (shrink)

Smith shoots Jones intentionally but kills Jones unintentionally. How can a single act be both intentional and unintentional? Fine's theory of embodiment construes the compatibility of intentional shooting with unintentional killing through a pluralist framework of qua objects that distinguishes the act qua being a shooting from the act qua being a killing as two distinct qua objects. I compare this pluralist account with a more traditional monist take on qua modification according to which there is only one item there, (...) a single act which is intentional qua being a shooting and unintentional qua being a killing. According to the latter monist view, to be intentional is to bear a relation to a qua property. I argue that consideration of our moral practices from a participant standpoint gives the monist view a clear advantage over its pluralist rival. I end by sketching a monist alternative superior to both. (shrink)

In this paper a critique to philosophical approaches that presuppose invariant knowledge for policy purposes is carried out. It is shown that socioeconomic processes do not fit to the logic of stable causal factors, but they are more suited to the logic of "open-ended results". On the basis of this ontological variation it is argued that ex-ante interventions are not appropriate in the socioeconomic realm. On the contrary, they must be understood in a “dynamic” sense. Finally, derivational robustness analysis is (...) proposed as a useful tool for overcoming the problem of “overconstraint”, a typical problem of economic models. (shrink)

There is a familiar disagreement between Justice Antonin Scalia of the US Supreme Court and Ronald Dworkin over whether the Eighth Amendment to the US Constitution could be plausibly interpreted so as to prohibit capital punishment. The dispute reflects a deep divergence in approach to statutory interpretation. I explore this divergence by paying particularly close attention to its metasemantic background. I then argue that the metasemantic orientation clearly vindicates the Dworkinian side.

Dejando de lado puntos de tensión y desencuentro, el campo de investigación integrado por la Historia conceptual de Koselleck y el contextualismo lingüístico, sobre todo de Skinner, se ha explorado de manera fructífera en investigaciones que demuestran el potencial metodológico que sugiere su abordaje ecléctico. Propio de la lexicografía académica ha sido el intento de reconstruir “definiciones quintaesenciadas” que intentan afinar con total precisión el significado de cada concepto para extirpar su ambigüedad constitutiva. La mutabilidad y, por tanto, plurivocidad característica (...) de conceptos sociales, políticos y jurídicos hacen que la articulación entre ambas contribuciones metodológicas proporcione, como sostiene Richter, un relato histórico más satisfactorio del pensamiento y el lenguaje. El objetivo de este artículo, a partir de un estudio de fuentes primarias y secundarias, es reconstruir y explicar los perfiles medulares de ambas aproximaciones para analizar y demostrar los elementos de particular relevancia para la investigación conceptual en campos como el filosófico-político y el constitucional en Hispanoamérica, los cuales poco se han servido de esta fructífera propuesta metodológica. (shrink)

This paper presents a brief contribution to the study of the historical sources of Kant’s practical philosophy, discussing the Kantian project of a metaphysics of morals as a doctrine of duties in the context of German natural law of the 17th and 18th centuries. At first, Christian Thomasius’ distinction between internal and external obligation is exposed as the basis for the differentiation between legal duties and ethical duties. Then the Kantian opposition between a doctrine of right and a doctrine of (...) virtue is discussed against the background of Alexander Baumgarten’s and Gottfried Achenwall’s reception of Thomasius. (shrink)

Este artigo tem como foco uma análise do texto “A mulher e a arte” (sem data), da escritora carioca Júlia Lopes de Almeida (1862-1934). Este escrito, recém-publicado na íntegra pela primeira vez, em revista acadêmica, constitui uma conferência da autora na qual ela expõe suas opiniões sobre o tema da arte de autoria feminina, tecendo uma série de críticas de cunho feminista à desigualdade entre os gêneros no espaço da criação artística. Em seu texto, a literata cita diversos nomes de (...) artistas e intelectuais mulheres, de modo a sustentar seu argumento em defesa da potência criativa feminina e assinalar a importância da transformação da cultura patriarcal. Assim, a partir do olhar historiográfico e embasados pela epistemologia feminista, buscamos ressaltar a conferência como fundamental para o estudo da escrita de autoria feminina e feminista no Brasil entre os séculos XIX e XX.Palavras-chave: Júlia Lopes de Almeida. Literatura. Feminismo. AbstractThis article focuses on an analysis of the text “The woman and the art” (undated), by the writer Júlia Lopes de Almeida (1862-1934), from Rio de Janeiro. This writing, recently published in full for the first time, constitutes a conference in which the author exposes her opinions on the theme of art of female authorship, weaving a series of feminist criticisms of the inequality between genders in the space of artistic creation. In her text, Júlia lists several names of artists and women intellectuals, in order to support her argument in defense of the feminine creative power and point out the importance of the transformation of patriarchal culture. Thus, from the historiographic perspective and based on feminist epistemology, we seek to emphasize the conference as fundamental for the study of female and feminist writing feminists in Brazil between the 19th and 20th centuries.Keywords: Júlia Lopes de Almeida. Literature. Feminism. (shrink)